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HUDSON v. PALMER-"BRIGHT LINES"




Privacy' is a luxury virtually unknown in the daily lives of incar-
cerated offenders.2 While the United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized privacy as a protected interest under several constitutional
doctrines3 and has granted that prison inmates do not forfeit all civil
rights upon entering penal institutions, 4 the exigencies of confine-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. J.D., University of Utah,
1972; B.S., University of Utah, 1969.
1 A leading authority has defined privacy as "the claim of individuals.. . to deter-
mine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about themselves is
communicated to others." A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). See also Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 268 (1977); Parker, A Definition of
Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 281 (1974); Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 323, 331 (1975); van den Haag, On Privacy in PRIVACY 149 (J. Pennock &J.
Chapman eds. 1971), which conceptualize privacy as the ability to control to whom one
shares personal intimacies. Social conventions dictate the content of "intimacy." See,
e.g., C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 145 (1970); Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for
Persons in PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 1, 3-4; Gross, Privacy and Autonomy in PHILOSOPHY OF
LAw 191 (J. Fienberg & H. Gross eds. 1975).
2 Imprisonment entails radical denials of privacy:
A prisoner is mortified and vulgarized not only by having to continually expose
himself as he is moved and stored in the company of others; he is also defiled by
being subject to their exposure .... The custody orientation negates privacy in
innumerable other ways. These include such purposive intrusions as periodic
headcounts, nightly checks, inspections or shakedowns of prisoners' living areas
and belongings. Whatever tends to disturb visibility is forbidden.
Schwartz, Deprivation of Privacy as a "Functional Prerequisite" The Case of the Prison, 63 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 229, 232-34 (1972) (emphasis in original). A prison "shares
none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room."
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
3 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (decision to have an abortion is
privacy right protected by due process "liberty"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-
65 (1969) (possession of obscene material protected privacy interest under the first
amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy protected
under the "penumbra" of various bill of rights provisions); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (fourth amendment and fifth amendment self-incrimination clause
protect against governmental intrusions into the "privacies of life").
4 See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (prisoners protected from cruel and
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ment require prison officials to extensively intrude into the intima-
cies of inmates' lives. 5 Yet, until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Hudson v. Palmer,6 some courts appeared willing to afford
prisoners that modicum of constitutionally protected privacy consis-
tent with the weighty governmental interest in maintaining law and
order within penal institutions. 7 Palmer, however, signals the end of
unusual punishments by the eighth amendment); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974) (prisoners retain free speech rights not inconsistent with their prisoner status);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (procedural due process afforded prison
inmates); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (free exercise of religion pro-
tected in prison).
5 The necessity of maintaining internal security within prison facilities requires cur-
tailing certain inmate rights. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 823. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 550-51 (1979) (no first amendment right to receive publications not
mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or book stores because contraband might
otherwise be introduced into the institution); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (first amendment associational rights curtailed as a risk
to prison order and stability); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1969) (se-
curity demands justified refusal to accommodate inmates' religious practice of eating
meals after sunset).
6 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
7 Some courts have held that fourth amendment privacy protection is not available
to prison inmates. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d 15, 18 (Miss. 1975) (prisoners
lose their "constitutional protection against invasion of ... privacy and h[ave] no
standing to object to a search"); People v. Chandler, 262 Cal. App. 2d 350, 356, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 645, 648 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043 (1969) ("prison authorities may subject
inmates to intense surveillance and search unimpeded by Fourth Amendment barriers").
Other courts, however, recognize that prisoners retain minimal rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. These courts grant that institutional exigencies re-
sult in "decreased expectation[s] of privacy" by inmates; such expectations, however,
are sufficient to trigger "at least some degree" of fourth amendment protection. United
States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978). See also
United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974)
(inmate letter protected from unreasonable seizure); Burns v. Wilkinson, 333 F. Supp.
94, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (prisoners entitled to the protection of the fourth amend-
ment"); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.I. 1971) ("the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the rights retained by prisoners
subject, of course, to such curtailment as may be made necessary by the purposes of
confinement and the requirements of security").
The Supreme Court has articulated similar views. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
557 (1979), discussed in detail in text and notes 159-65 infra, the Court assumed argu-
endo that incarcerated individuals possess "diminished expectations of privacy." While
Volfish dealt with pretrial detainees, the Court recognized that its assessment of inmate
rights "applies equally to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners." Id. at 545-46.
Moreover, in another decision, a plurality of the Court in an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger rejected the first amendment challenge by news media to policies restricting
their access to a local prison, and specifically recognized prisoners' privacy rights as
"fundamental":
It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully confined, but they do
not lose all civil rights . . . .Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutions retain
certain fundamental rights of privacy; they are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and
photographed at will by the public or by media reporters, however 'educational' the
process may be for others.
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the judicial attempt to accommodate federal constitutional privacy
rights relating to searches of prisoners' cells and personal effects.
The Palmer Court held, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
over the dissent of four Justices8 and contrary to a substantial body
of lower court case law, that prison inmates possess no recognizable
privacy expectations in their prison cells.9 Prisoners are therefore
without fourth amendment protection against governmental confis-
cation and destruction of their personal property, even if the sole
purpose of the intrusion is to harass the inmate.10 Unlike persons in
the free world, prisoners enjoy no right "to be secure in their...
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.""1
The Palmer Court specifically excluded from fourth amendment
scope the confiscation of an inmate's letters and legal materials ob-
tained by prison guards during unannounced cell "shakedowns."
The Court, therefore, explicitly spoke to privacy issues relating to
possession of personal property. If the ChiefJustice's opinion were
limited to such "property" issues the opinion would, as illustrated
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978) (emphasis added).
8 Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in Palmer. 104 S. Ct.
at 3207-17. For a discussion of their dissent, see infra notes 48-67 and accompanying
text.
9 Before Palmer, a majority of the federal courts of appeals deciding the issue held
that prisoners retain at least limited fourth amendment privacy protection in their cells.
Id. at 3198 n.5. See United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1043 (1982); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 129-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 832 (8th Cir. 1977); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517
F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975) afd on rehearing, 545 F.2d 565 (1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). A minority of federal courts have held the fourth amend-
ment inapplicable to prison cells. See Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir.
1972).
Despite these developments in the federal courts, the majority of cases hold that
prisoners forfeit fourth amendment rights upon incarceration. See S. KRANTZ, CORREC-
TIONS AND PRISONER'S RmHTS 155 (2d ed. 1983); Gianelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and
Seizures: 'Locking' the Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REv. 1045,
1046-47 (1976); Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry
Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in Our Prisons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV.
669, 672 (1972).
10 Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3202. The Palmer Court recognized the reality of occasional
harassment of inmates, but suggested that the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments provides the constitutional remedy. Id. As for re-
dressing property rights infringed through malicious destruction of inmate personalty,
the Court viewed state remedies as sufficient. Id.
11 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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by the Palmer dissent, be controversial enough. 12 Palmer's signifi-
cance is magnified, however, because the opinion provides the theo-
retical basis for the total demise of constitutional rights of inmate
privacy by implying that personal privacy, as well as privacy rights
regarding one's papers and effects, also is unprotected. 13
This Article assesses the merits of the Palmer opinion and its
implications for the continued vitality of constitutionally protected
privacy in penal institutions. The critique reveals deficiencies in the
Court's analysis of the scope of fourth amendment safeguards and
argues (the Court's allusions to the contrary notwithstanding) that a
doctrine of privacy protection is essential to safeguard inmates'
basic human rights.
II. THE PALMER CASE
A. THE FACTS
Palmer was an inmate at a Virginia Correctional Center 14 serv-
ing sentences for several theft offenses. Hudson, an officer at the
Center, in an alleged effort to discover contraband, conducted a
shakedown search of Palmer's cell and locker. The search uncov-
ered a ripped pillowcase which was used to trigger a disciplinary
action against Palmer for destroying state property. Pursuant to
prison procedures, Palmer was found guilty and ordered to reim-
burse the state for the cost of the pillowcase; additionally, prison
authorities entered a reprimand on Palmer's prison record.
Palmer subsequently brought a civil rights action in United
States District Court contending, among other things, 15 that Hud-
son had violated his fourth amendment rights by conducting the
shakedown solely for harassment purposes and by destroying cer-
tain of Palmer's noncontraband property, including legal materials
and letters. 16 Hudson denied the allegations and received a sum-
12 See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 155-226 and accompanying text.
14 Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts discuss the degree of security
manifested by the correctional center.
15 Palmer brought his action under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1981). He raised a due process argument, not discussed in this Article, alleging that his
property had been improperly taken and destroyed. Both the Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court rejected the due process claim on the theory that the state provided
Palmer adequate postdeprivation remedies. See Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220,
1222-23 (4th Cir. 1983); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. at 3203-05. Palmer also introduced
additional due process claims and an eighth amendment argument, all of which were
summarily dismissed by the district court and the Fourth Circuit, 697 F.2d at 1221 n.1,
and not raised in the Supreme Court.
16 104 S. Ct. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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mary judgment. The district court accepted Palmer's allegations as
true, but held that they were constitutionally insignificant.17
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding
the summary judgment premature because Hudson may have vio-
lated Palmer's "limited privacy right" against searches conducted
solely for harassment.18 The court of appeals found that unan-
nounced shakedown searches of an inmate's property are necessary
security protections, but determined that shakedowns of individual
inmates are permissible only if "pursuant to an established program
of conducting random searches of single cells or groups of cells rea-
sonably designed to deter or discover the possession of contra-
band" 9 or upon proof "that some reasonable basis exist[s] for the
belief that the prisoner possesse[s] contraband." 20
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2' to con-
sider, among other things,22 "whether a prison inmate has a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his prison cell" entitling him to fourth
amendment protection.23
B. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION
The Supreme Court reversed the fourth circuit, holding that
although inmates enjoy those constitutional rights "not fundamen-
tally inconsistent with. . . the objectives of incarceration, " 24 fourth
amendment protection of prison cells, even to the "limited" extent
recognized by the court of appeals, was unavailable to Palmer.25
The Court grounded its decision on Palmer's inability to establish a
privacy interest sufficient to trigger the fourth amendment.
The Court determined the issue to be whether Palmer could
satisfy the "justifiable expectation of privacy" test of Katz v. United
States.26 The applicability of the fourth amendment, according to
the Palmer Court, turns on whether "the person invoking its protec-
tion can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy,' that has been invaded by government action." '27
17 697 F.2d at 1222.
18 Id. at 1223-25.
19 Id. at 1224.
20 Id. at 1225.
21 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983).
22 For a discussion of the due process issue raised in Palmer, see supra, note 15.
23 104 S. Ct. at 3196.
24 Id. at 3198.
25 Id. at 3197-202.
26 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of the Katz decision, see infra notes 71-87
and accompanying text.
27 104 S. Ct. at 3199.
1985]
MARTIN R. GARDNER
More specifically, the Court invoked Justice Harlan's formulation in
his concurring opinion in Katz: "We must decide, in Justice
Harlan's words, whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy in his
prison cell is the kind of expectation that 'society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable".' "28
The Court concluded that "society is not prepared to recognize
as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner
might have in his prison cell. .... "29 The Chief Justice found that
protecting society's interest in maintaining the security of its penal
institutions-volatile places where the threat of violence and the
possession of contraband are ubiquitous30 -is "impossible . .. if
inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells." '31 The "limited"
right articulated by the court of appeals would, in the opinion of the
Palmer Court, enable inmates to anticipate the occurrence of shake-
downs because they would eventually decipher the official scheme of
"planned random searches."'3 2 Because their cells are "[v]irtually
the only place inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other con-
traband," 33 the Court found that "wholly random [cell] searches are
essential to the effective security of penal institutions." 34 Only the
"bright line" approach of denying fourth amendment protection al-
together3 5 protects against deterioration of prison security and or-
der. "The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their
individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of in-
carceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions. '" 3 6
The Palmer Court also recognized the power of prison officials
to seize from cells "any articles which, in their view, disserve legiti-
mate institutional interests." 37 The redress of inmate losses caused
by improper destruction of seized property rests under state rather
than federal law.3 8
The Court recognized the possibility of intrusions conducted
solely to harass, and noted that "intentional harassment of even the
most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized soci-
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3200.
30 The Court referred to statistics reflecting the incidence of criminal activity within
penal institutions. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 3201.
33 Id. at 3200.
34 Id. at 3201.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 3200.




ety."3 9 The Court concluded, however, that the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments constitutes the
constitutional remedy for such violations.40
C. THE O'CONNOR OPINION
Justice O'Connor joined the Court's opinion but concurred
separately.4 1 Justice O'Connor contended that Palmer's privacy
claim was unfounded due to its failure to show "unreasonable" gov-
ernmental action in light of the government's compelling interest in
prison safety.42 Citing United States v. Robinson,43 she concluded that
no case-by-case assessment of reasonableness in prison cases was
necessary because the Court had held in other contexts that certain
39 Id. at 3201. The Court noted that "the way a society treats those who have trans-
gressed against it is evidence of the essential character of that society." Id. at 3199.
40 The eighth amendment provides in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. The Palmer Court stated:
Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
enabling him to invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment does not mean
that he is without a remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.
Nor does it mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod over inmates' property
rights with impunity. The Eighth Amendment always stands as a protection against
'cruel and unusual punishments.' By the same token, there are adequate state tort
and common-law remedies available to respondent to redress the alleged destruc-
tion of his personal property.
104 S. Ct. at 3202. The Palmer Court did not recognize an alternative remedy for viola-
tion of privacy under a substantive due process theory. For a discussion of due process
privacy, see infra notes 169-77 and accompanying text. Instead, the Court implied that a
fourteenth amendment due process remedy was not available because it merged with the
rejected fourth amendment privacy claim:
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals' decision rests at least in part
upon a finding of an independent right of privacy for prisoners under the Four-
teenth Amendment alone. Arguably, it is not entirely clear whether the Court of
Appeals believed that the limited privacy right it recognized was guaranteed solely
by the Fourth Amendment, and applicable to the States only through the Four-
teenth Amendment, or whether the right emanated from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment alone, or both. The court's opinion, however, explicitly speaks to the 'primary
purpose of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,'. . . and nowhere does it sug-
gest an intention to draw a distinction between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments right of privacy in prison cells. Under the circumstances, we assume, since
there is no suggestion to the contrary, that the court did not mean to imply in this
context that any right of privacy that might exist under the Fourteenth Amendment
alone exceeds that that exists under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 3197 n.4.
41 104 S. Ct. at 3205 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
42 Id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Robinson holds that the fourth amendment permits warrant-
less searches of the person incident to lawful custodial arrests. The decision in Robinson
is not concerned with defining "searches and seizures," but rather with when personal
searches and seizures are "reasonable."
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contested practices are categorically permitted.44 In light of the in-
terests at stake, prison searches are the categorically reasonable
products of necessarily ad hocjudgments of prison officials maintain-
ing prison safety.45 Moreover, according to Justice O'Connor, the
"fact of arrest and incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amend-
ment privacy . . . interests in personal effects." '4 6 Consequently,
"all searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate's cell are
reasonable." 47
D. THE PALMER DISSENT
Justice Stevens,joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Black-
mun, dissented in Palmer,48 contending that prisoners are entitled to
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches of
their cells and seizures of their property. Accepting the allegations
in the complaint as true,49 the dissenters found a clear fourth
amendment violation in Hudson's malicious confiscation and de-
struction of Palmer's property- his possession of which was pro-
tected under state law and by several constitutional provisions. 50
Agreeing with the majority that the imperatives of prison adminis-
tration require random searches of prison cells,51 Justice Stevens re-
jected the view that the legitimacy of such searches negates the
possibility of protecting inmate privacy in their cells and posses-
sions. He granted that privacy rights will no doubt be "minimal"
compared to conditions in the free world, but prisoners must be af-
forded a "slight residuum of privacy" in their cells lest they be to-
tally stripped of their dignity.52 "From the standpoint of the
prisoner. . . that trivial residuum may mark the difference between
44 Justice O'Connor lists two contested practices: searches incident to arrest and




48 104 S. Ct. at 3207-17 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
49 The dissenters noted:
This case comes to us on the pleadings. We must take the allegations in Palmer's
complaint as true. Liberally construing this pro se complaint as we must, it alleges
that after examining it, . . . Hudson maliciously took and destroyed a quantity of
Palmer's property, including legal materials and letters, for no reason other than
harassment.
Id. at 3207-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50 In addition to property rights under state law, the dissenters cited first amend-
ment, eighth amendment, and due process theories as constitutional grounds protecting
Palmer's interests in the confiscated materials. Id. at 3210-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 3208, 3215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 76
PRISONER PRIVACY RIGHTS
slavery and humanity." 53 Moreover, the dissenters contested the
empirical validity of the majority's conclusion that "society is
[un]prepared to recognize [as reasonable] the possessory interests
of prisoners" 54 and chided the majority for disregarding the signifi-
cance of the fact that "[v]irtually every federal judge to address the
question over the past decade has concluded that the Fourth
Amendment does apply to a prison cell." 55
Apart from privacy considerations, Justice Stevens contended
that Palmer's property rights themselves were sufficient to trigger
fourth amendment protection. Hudson's actions clearly constituted
a "seizure" depriving Palmer of his possessory interests in his
property. 56
Having concluded that Palmer's complaint alleged a "search
and seizure," the dissenters easily found fourth amendment "unrea-
sonableness." The intrusion alleged by Palmer could not be peno-
logically justified or excused, and therefore was necessarily
unreasonable. 57 To the dissenters, protecting a residuum of inmate
privacy and possessory rights to noncontraband property is essen-
tial to the government's goal of maintaining prison security.58
Otherwise, prisoners are "deprived of any sense of individuality
[and] devalue themselves and others and therefore are more prone
to violence toward themselves or others." 59 Moreover, the total re-
jection of inmate privacy rights is inconsistent with the rehabilitative
function of correctional institutions.60
53 Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 3212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens states:
The Court's holding is based on its belief that society would not recognize as
reasonable the possessory interests of prisoners. Its perception of what society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable is not based on any empirical data; rather it
merely reflects the perception of the fourJustices who have joined the opinion that
THE CHIEF JUSTICE has authored.
Id.
55 Id. at 3212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56 Id. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Justice Stevens states:
In the final analysis, however, any deference to institutional needs is totally
undermined by the fact that Palmer's property was not contraband. If Palmer were
allowed to possess the property, then there can be no contention that any institu-
tional need or policyjustified the seizure and destruction of the property. Once it is
agreed that random searches of a prisoner's cell are reasonable to ensure that the
cell contains no contraband, there can be no need for seizure and destruction of
noncontraband items found during such searches.
Id. at 3215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 "[It appears to be the near-universal view of correctional officers that guards
should neither seize nor destroy noncontraband property." Id. at 3213 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
59 Id. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing Schwartz, supra note 2.
60 104 S. Ct. at 3214 (Stevens,J., disssenting). 'It is anomalous to provide a prisoner
19851
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Justice Stevens also disputed the Chief Justice's assessment of
the dangerousness of prisons, pointing out that the homicide rate in
prisons is "significantly lower than. . . in many. . . major cities." 6 1
Moreover, many inmates, even in maximum security institutions, are
not violent people 62 and most minimum security facilities are popu-
lated by inmates who pose no realistic threat to security ... .
These considerations led the dissenters to suspect that the in-
terest in institutional security may be something of a red herring in
the majority opinion. To Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice's posi-
tion might best be explained as an unstated willingness to sacrifice
constitutional principle on the altar of expediency. In addition to
promoting its view of wise penal administration,64 the Palmer Court's
adoption of a "bright line" rule avoided the possibility of flooding
the courts with frivolous lawsuits65 -a fear, the dissenters pointed
out, which posed insufficient justification for modifying pre-Palmer
case law permitting inmates fourth amendment protection. In fact
the "flood" had never materialized under such case law, and the dis-
senters believed that it could easily be handled if it ever occurred. 66
Finally, Justice Stevens expressed hope that Palmer would not
affect inmates' interests in personal privacy. "The Court's [repeal of
the fourth amendment] . . . appears to [be], limit[ed] to a pris-
oner's 'papers and effects' located in his cell. Apparently [the
Court] believes that at least a prisoner's 'person' is secure from un-
reasonable search and seizure." 67
with rehabilitative programs . . . in an effort to build self-respect while simultaneously
subjecting him to unjustified and degrading searches and seizures.' Id. (quoting Gianelli
& Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1069).
61 104 S. Ct. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Justice Stevens notes:
The Court's portrayal of the stereotypical prison inmate entirely overlooks the
wide range of individuals who actually have served and do serve time in the prison
system. It ignores, for example, the conscientious objectors who refuse to register
for the draft, and the corporate executives who have been convicted of violating
securities, antitrust or tax laws, union leaders, former White House aides, former
governors, judges, and legislators, famous writers and sports heroes, and many
thousands who have committed serious offenses but for whom crime is by no means
a way of life.
Id. at 3215 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 3209 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority did not address the security
level of the penal institution involved in the case; thus Palmer cannot be read as automat-
ically limiting the fourth amendment rights of only those inmates confined in maximum
security institutions.
64 Id. at 3216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 3215 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 3216 n.31 (StevensJ, dissenting).
[Vol. 76
PRISONER PRIVACY RIGHTS
E. THE PALMER OPINIONS: A BRIEF ASSESSMENT
Several of the dissent's criticisms appear particularly telling.
The Chief Justice is unconvincing in concluding that prisons are
dangerous places and therefore security demands automatically out-
weigh any privacy interests of inmates.68 This position is plausible
only upon a showing that prisons are significantly more dangerous
places than other areas. Moreover, to conclude, as the Palmer Court
appears to do, that all prisons, maximum or minimum security, are
equally dangerous is fatuous. But even if all prison life is sui generis
in magnifying risks to order and security, the Palmer majority never
explains why governmental interests are unduly sacrificed by per-
mitting inmates like Palmer to litigate fourth amendment claims of
official harassment. The bringing of such actions poses no risk to
security-if anything, protecting a residuum of privacy is consistent
with security demands 69-and the concern about a deluge of frivo-
lous lawsuits itself seems frivolous. 70
While the Palmer dissent points out these deficiencies, it fails to
explore other fundamental problems with the Chief Justice's opin-
ion. The remainder of this Article will address two such problems-
the Court's general analytical approach to defining the scope of the
fourth amendment, and the effect of Palmer on issues of prisoners'
rights to personal privacy.
III. DEFINING FOURTH AMENDMENT SCOPE
The Palmer Court continues an analytic tradition begun by Katz
v. United States.71 In Katz, the Court rejected earlier judicial attempts
to define "searches and seizures" in terms of physical intrusions
into certain protected areas and adopted an approach extending the
fourth amendment to situations where the government invades rec-
ognizable privacy.72 While the emergence of a privacy oriented test
is laudable in principle,73 sound doctrinal advancement has been
68 With no disrespect intended toward the ChiefJustice, the following observation of
Hugo Bedau might be noted: "Along with patriotism, security-national security and
prison security-is the last refuge of scoundrels." Bedau, How to Argue About Prisoners'
Rights: Some Simple Ways, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 687, 702 (1981).
69 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
71 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72 See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 356-409
(1974); Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968 (1968).
73 Professor Kitch describes the focus on privacy as "more congruent with the Fourth
Amendment's central purpose to protect the privacy of the citizen from unreasonable
government investigation than the property principle." Kitch, Katz v. United States:
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frustrated by judicial interpretations of Katz which have resulted in
an unfortunate restriction of the scope of the fourth amendment.
Palmer perpetuates this misguided trend.
A. THE KATZ STANDARD
In Katz, the Court laid the foundation for defining the scope of
the fourth amendment's protection of privacy,74 the central value
underlying the proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.7 5 The Katz Court held that governmental use of an elec-
tronic monitoring device placed on the outside of a public tele-
phone to intercept Katz's phone conversations involving illegal
gambling activities constituted an illegal search and seizure. The
government had invaded Katz's "justifiable reliance on privacy,"
therefore a fourth amendment "search and seizure" had occurred
that was "unreasonable" for want of a supporting warrant. 76
The Court in Katz perceived the issue of defining fourth amend-
ment "reasonableness" as distinct from the analytically prior issue
of determining whether or not a "search or seizure" has occurred.77
Moreover, searches and seizures are not limited to specific constitu-
tionally protected areas like the home, but occur whenever the gov-
ernment intrudes on one's legally recognizable privacy.78 Katz is
The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133, 134-35. Indeed, under the
earlier protected area approach, most electronic surveillance would go unregulated be-
cause it entails no physical trespass into a protected area. See Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
74 See supra sources cited at notes 72 and 73; see also 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 220-40 (1978); C. WHrrEBREAD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTrrUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 91-94
(1980).
75 "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this Amendment, as
recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.").
76 389 U.S. at 354-59.
77 The Katz Court considered the "reasonableness" of the government's conduct as a
"question remaining" after having determined that a "search and seizure" had oc-
curred. 389 U.S. at 354. Professor Whitebread describes the two-step process as
follows:
If it is determined that no Fourth Amendment right is involved . . . because the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy, then the [intrusion] . . . in
question can have no impact on subsequent prosecution. However, if it is deter-
mined that a Fourth Amendment right does exist, the second step is to determine
whether the governmental conduct was reasonable.
C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 74, at 102.
78 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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problematic, however, in defining protected privacy, particularly
when privacy claims arise from intrusions involving novel means of
investigation or surveillance 79 or occur in seemingly public contexts
which nevertheless embody aspects of privacy.80
The Katz Court took meager steps at clarifying the standard:
"[T]he. . . Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected."81 This suggests a subjective stan-
dard; the fourth amendment protects what one seeks to keep pri-
vate. Yet, the Court's implication that subjective desires for privacy
only sometimes trigger the fourth amendment-they "may be consti-
tutionally protected" 82 -belies an exclusively subjective test. Such a
test would permit the government to circumvent the fourth amend-
79 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (use of a "beeper," a battery
operated monitoring device, attached to a container of chemicals used to manufacture
illicit drugs prior to its purchase by suspect not a "search"); but see United States v. Karo,
104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (use of "beeper" to monitor activities within suspect's house is a
"search"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of "pen registers" to record
phone numbers dialed by suspect not a "search") For a discussion of Smith, Knotts, and
Karo, see infra notes 114-20, 127-30 and accompanying text.
80 Legitimate exclusive control of a given area or object generally embodies privacy
expectations and thus poses few Katz problems. On the other hand, a whole range of
places raise difficulties under Katz. Restaurants, public parks, lobbies, air, rail and bus
terminals reflect no exclusive rights of control, but nevertheless are contexts where
many intimate affairs occur. See Kitch, supra note 73, at 137.
Searches in the public schools have posed a special problem. Some courts have
suggested that students possess few privacy expectations while in school. See, e.g., Doe v.
Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ind. 1979), modified, 631 F.2d 91, reh'g denied,
635 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982) (sniffs of stu-
dents by dogs not a "search"). Other courts hold that the school environment has little
effect in diminishing privacy expectations. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent
School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 478-79, reh 'g denied, 693 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207 (1983) (sniffs of students by dogs are "searches"). See generally Gardner,
Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom- Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.
803 (1980). The Supreme Court recently addressed the school search issue, holding that
the fourth amendment protects students from searches and seizures by school authori-
ties unless supported by "reasonable suspicion" that the student was violating either the
law or a school rule. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
Equally problematic are the "toilet spy" cases where police conduct clandestine sur-
veillance of public restrooms. Some courts find such intrusions to be within the scope of
the fourth amendment, especially if the restroom stalls have doors. See, e.g., Brown v.
State, 3 Md. App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 (1968); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d
800 (1970). Other courts find no privacy invasion where the stalls have no doors. See,
e.g., People v. Heath, 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968); People v. Roberts,
256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967) (observation through peepholes into
public area of restroom).
81 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
82 See supra text accompanying note 81.
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ment by defeating claims of subjective privacy by simply notifying
the public that a given area previously thought to be private would
henceforth be systematically invaded. 83 On the other hand, the
subjective test would trigger fourth amendment protections where
claimants assert actual privacy reliances in situations where such
claims appear ridiculous. 84
In an attempt to clarify the scope of the privacy interest pro-
tected by the fourth amendment, Justice Harlan articulated his "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" test embraced in Palmer85 and
previously accepted by the Court.86 Justice Harlan added an "ob-
jective" prong: "there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable.' "87
B. JUSTICE HARLAN'S TEST: AMBIGUITIES AND INADEQUACIES
WhileJustice Harlan's test avoids the evils of a totally subjective
test, it has substantial flaws.88 The requirement that "society...
recognize [privacy expectations] as 'reasonable' " is ambiguous. 8 9
The Harlan test may be interpreted two different ways: one with an
83 Professor Amsterdam summarizes the problems inherent in a subjective test:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of
what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither
add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment
protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective ex-
pectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was
being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under com-
prehensive electronic surveillance.
Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 384.
84 For example, imagine that a police officer walking his beat at high noon in a public
park observes a defendant commit a crime. The defendant argues that the observation
constitutes a warrantless search because the defendant actually believed his conduct
took place in "private" because he took the precaution of checking for police prior to
committing the offense.
85 See supra text accompanying note 28.
86 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
87 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
88 Some courts have used the subjective prong ofJustice Harlan's test to deny fourth
amendment protection in cases where the reasonableness of the intrusion arguably
might demand attention. See, e.g., People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App. 3d 476, 482, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 292, 296 (1970). In Califano, the defendant was placed in a police interview room
with an accomplice. A hidden microphone recorded incriminating remarks. The defend-
ant's fourth amendment challenge was rejected because, among other things, the court
concluded that he entertained no subjective expectations of privacy based upon his re-
mark: "They ... are probably listening right now [laughter]."
89 One commentator has suggested that Katz destroyed "whatever clarity" had ex-
isted in the law defining fourth amendment scope. White, The Fourth Amendment as a 1Vav,
of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 174.
[Vol. 76
PRISONER PRIVACY RIGHTS
empirical emphasis aimed at discovering and describing normal pri-
vacy expectations-those which people "reasonably" possess in
fact- the other directed towards the normative problem of deter-
mining rights to possess privacy expectations - those which people
"reasonably" deserve to possess.
The "empirical" interpretation assumes an objective ability to
determine whether a legally recognizable privacy intrusion has oc-
curred in a given case. 90 Inferences from established social prac-
tices may provide guidance in some cases, but often no objective
referent will exist to measure whether society recognizes a given pri-
vacy expectation as reasonable.9' In such cases, courts applying the
"empirical" interpretation will likely resort to either of two ap-
proaches, both of which have a tendency to constrict the scope of
the fourth amendment.
The first approach appeals to assumption of risk analysis in de-
fining "reasonable expectations of privacy." If a reasonable person
would have taken precautions to protect privacy, no fourth amend-
ment intrusion occurs when such precautions are not taken and the
government intrudes.9 2 Individuals assume the risk of government
intrusion when they fail to take sufficient precautions against intru-
sion. Thus, the failure to pull the curtains precludes "a reasonable
expectation of privacy" in a room whose interior could not be ob-
served from ground level but into which FBI agents peered with
binoculars while atop a ladder on railroad tracks thirty-five feet
away.93
The second judicial approach in applying the "empirical" inter-
9o Professor Yackle describes the "empirical interpretation" of the Harlan test as
follows:
In recent cases, the Court has looked not for the individual's 'justifiable' but for
his or her 'reasonable' or 'legitimate' expectation of privacy. The difference is more
than semantical. The latter phrases invite reference not to the Constitution itself, to
'what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect,' but rather to what expecta-
tions contemporary Americans in fact have. It is as though the fourth amendment
only mirrors existing understandings, protecting privacy more or less as expecta-
tions that privacy be protected rise and fall.
Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REV. 335, 361 (1978).
91 See Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE LJ.
1461, 1473-74 (1977).
92 See Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV.
154, 168-71 (1977).
93 See Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971). See also United States v. Fisch, 475 F.2d 1071, 1078 n.15
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973) (quoting State v. Smith, 37 NJ. 481, 496, 181
A.2d 761, 769 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963)): "[Ilt is the duty of the police-
man to investigate, and we cannot say that. . . the Fourth Amendment itself draws the
blinds the occupant could have drawn but did not." But see United States v. Kim, 415 F.
Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (the court found a "search" when FBI agents from a quar-
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pretation ofJustice Harlan's test is to balance interests in discerning
"reasonable expectations of privacy." Given the absence of external
standards, courts sometimes weigh alleged privacy interests against
other values-most often the need for effective law enforcement-in
deciding whether a search or seizure has occurred.94 Thus, if an
intrusion reflects "normal" police behavior generally conducive to
the realization of law enforcement interests, the conduct may be
judged "reasonable." 95 If so, the courts may find claimed privacy
expectations to be "unreasonable" or non-existent. 96 Such an
ter mile away used a telescope to peer into defendant's high-rise apartment to determine
what he was reading).
94 See Note, supra note 91, at 1474-76. The balancing approach is elsewhere de-
scribed: "[A]n expectation of privacy will be reasonable if in a given context it is one
normally shared by people in that setting and at the same time falls within some toler-
ance level which represents the limit of what society can accept given its interest in law
enforcement." Note, The Supreme Court: 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 192 (1968).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1976) (use of dogs to
sniff semi-trailer for illicit drugs is "reasonable" police conduct); People v. Cooper, 17
Cal. App. 3d 1112, 1118, 95 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (1971) (police acted "reasonably" in
using fire escape to observe suspect in his apartment to determine whether he would
offer armed resistance to police entry).
96 In both Cooper and Solis, the courts weighed the reasonableness of the police action
against the privacy claims of defendants and held that no search had occurred. In Cooper,
the court stated: "It follows that the officer's utilization of the fire escape was . . . rea-
sonable. That is to say, in the circumstances. . . the procedure followed by the officers
constituted no unreasonable invasion of appellant's right to privacy." Cooper, 17 Cal.
App. 3d at 1118, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 475. Likewise, in Solis, the court stated:
The dogs' intrusion such as it was into the air space open to the public in the vicinity
of the trailer appears to us reasonably tolerable in our society. . . .We hold that
the use of the dogs was not unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore
not a prohibited search under the fourth amendment.
536 F.2d at 882-83. See also Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1021-22, where the court
reasoned that because the use of dogs to sniff students for drugs constituted an accepta-
ble "aid" to school administrators in the reasonable exercise of their educational duties,
the sniffs of students by the dogs infringed no justifiable expectations of privacy.
The judiciary has used similar reasoning in assessing the fourth amendment inter-
ests of parolees while on parole. Courts have often concluded that parolees enjoy di-
minished expectations of privacy solely because law enforcement interests in supervising
parole through periodic privacy invasions appear especially strong. See, e.g., People v.
Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 764,488 P.2d 630, 633, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1016 (1972) (parolees have "reduced expectations of privacy, thereby render-
ing certain intrusions by governmental authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would
be invalid"). See also People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100,
104 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965) (parolee may not assert fourth amendment
claims against those who supervise him on parole because he enjoys the same privacy
protections-none-enjoyed while in prison).
Finally, the Supreme Court engaged in the balancing approach in holding that bank
depositors possess no legitimate expectation of privacy in their bank records because
the government has a strong interest in obtaining access to such information:
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in
bank records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the ex-
pressed purpose of which is to require records to be maintained because they 'have
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approach defines privacy, partly at least, in terms of the nature of
the government's conduct, and thus appears at odds with the at-
tempt of the Katz Court to analyze the privacy issue separately from
the issue of whether the government acted reasonably.9 7
Both varieties of the empirical interpretation of the expectation
of privacy test are misguided. The assumption of risk analysis places
virtually no a priori limits on governmental surveillance. As Profes-
sor Amsterdam noted:
[U]nless the fourth amendment controls tom-peeping and subjects it
to a requirement of antecedent cause to believe that what is inside any
particular window is indeed criminal, police may look through win-
dows and observe a thousand innocent acts for every guilty act they
spy out. Should we say that prospect is not alarming because the inno-
cent homeowner need not fear that he will get caught doing anything
wrong? The fourth amendment protects not against incrimination, but
against invasions of privacy. . . .The question is not whether you or
I must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is whether you
and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter
a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.98
The balancing approach also is defective. By weighing the rea-
sonableness of the law enforcement action against the privacy
claim,9 9 the balancing approach rejects the teaching of Katz that
searches and seizures occur when privacy is invaded whether or not
the government's conduct is "reasonable"10 0 and tends to constrict
the effectuation of constitutional values. 10 ' To determine the rea-
sonableness of governmental conduct, courts applying the balanc-
ing approach often employ non-technical, common-sense concepts
of rationality and weigh them against privacy claims.' 0 2 While
a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and
proceedings.'
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
97 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
98 Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 403.
99 See supra text accompanying note 97.
100 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), provides a vivid example of the Court's attempts
to distinguish the "search" and "reasonableness" issues. The Teny Court painstakingly
found "stops" and "frisks" to be privacy violations and thus searches and seizures
before holding them to be reasonable under certain circumstances. Id. at 16-17, 19-31.
An advocate of assumption of risk analysis offers this condemnation of the balancing
approach: "The 'reasonableness' of privacy expectations must be measured by how the
'average person' shields his private activities from public exposure, not by the 'reasona-
bleness' of restricting a given police stratagem." Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and
the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. REv. 831, 838 (1972).
101 See Gianelli & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1064-66.
102 The concept of rationality expressed in the text is really more of a description of
normal and supposedly necessary police practices rather than a rigorous fourth amend-
ment evaluation of such. Therefore, the analysis tends to be empirical rather than nor-
mative. The analysis is "non-technical" in the sense that it avoids assessing the police
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common sense notions of normal or generally acceptable police
conduct might appear relevant in assessing whether or not "society
is prepared to recognize a privacy claim as reasonable," °1 0 3 a court
utilizing this form of "rationality" often disposes of the case on the
theory that no "search" occurred without ever considering the issue
of the fourth amendment reasonableness or justification of the intru-
sion. 10 4 Police conduct, reasonably acceptable in general terms, ef-
fectively balances away the claim that a "search" occurred.
Consequently, the balancing approach risks denying fourth amend-
ment consideration entirely in situations where privacy has clearly
been invaded but where ad hoc judicial comparisons determine that
law enforcement concerns outweigh the privacy interest.10 5
Such deficiencies in the "empirical interpretation" of the
Harlan test have led many commentators to reject that approach in
favor of a "normative interpretation" of the test,106 directing the
inquiry away from discovering empirically reasonable expectations
towards explicating morally justifiable ones. The normative theo-
rists characteristically scrutinize the type of governmental intrusion
at issue and determine whether its systematic use would be intolera-
ble in light of underlying constitutional values. Professor LaFave
states:
It must be asked whether permitting the police regularly to engage in
that type of practice, limited by nothing 'more than self-restraint by
law enforcement officials,' requires the 'people' to which the Fourth
Amendment refers to give 'up too much freedom as the cost of pri-
vacy.' That is, the fundamental inquiry is whether that practice, if not
subjected to Fourth Amendment restraints, would be intolerable be-
conduct in terms of such traditional fourth amendment considerations as the need for
particularized suspicion prior to intrusions or of the desirability of appeal to the warrant
process. See Note, supra note 91, at 1474 n.71.
103 Justice Harlan's test requires assessing the situation from society's point of view, a
point of view which may or may not embrace the Constitution's protection of individual
rights.
104 Intrusions may be upheld due to an absence of privacy expectations as balanced
against law enforcement interests without addressing such fourth amendment issues as
the requirement of particularized suspicion prior to the intrusion or of the need for a
search or arrest warrant. See supra notes 95, 96, 102 & 103.
105 See Note, supra note 91, at 1474. The Supreme Court warned against a similar
approach in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969):
It is argued in the present case that it is 'reasonable' to search a man's house when
he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more than a subjective
view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on con-
siderations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined
analysis, Fourth Amendment protection ...would approach the evaporation
point.
Id.
106 See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text; see also Gianelli & Gilligan, supra
note 9, at 1067-68; Yackle, supra note 90, at 358-63.
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cause it would either encroach too much upon the 'sense of security'
or impose unreasonable burdens upon those who wished to maintain
that security.10 7
Professor Amsterdam invokes a similar conception:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a valuejudgment. It is whether,
if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permit-
ted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of pri-
vacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. That, in
outright terms, is the judgment lurking underneath the Supreme
Court's decision in Katz, and it seems to me the judgment that the
fourth amendment inexorably requires the Court to make.10 8
Perhaps the most significant articulation of the normative ap-
proach is offered by Justice Harlan himself, who ultimately dis-
avowed the emerging empirical focus on privacy expectations
spawned by his Katz concurrence.
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective ex-
pectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expecta-
tions, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as to
mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expecta-
tions and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them
upon society.' 0 9
Courts making a Katz inquiry, therefore, should not decide mat-
ters of fact about privacy, either in the sense of how "society" views
the matter or whether the claimant actually entertains an expecta-
tion. Rather, they should determine the issue in light of underlying
constitutional values addressing whether given expectations of pri-
vacy ought to be recognized.
While the normative approach may be somewhat circular -
"the fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably
claim fourth amendment protection" 1 0 - the analysis is flawed to
no greater degree than the views which hold that a person has no
privacy expectation in a room with open curtains because someone
might use binoculars to snoop inside'I or that an individual has no
privacy expectations when the police invade a seemingly private
107 W. LAFAVE, supra note 74, at 233.
108 Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 403.
109 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan elaborated further:
"The question must, in my view, be answered by assessing the nature of a particular
practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced
against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." Id.
110 Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 385.
111 See supra text accompanying note 98.
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area, but conduct themselves forthrightly in gathering evidence.112
On the other hand, the normative approach has the distinct advan-
tage over its empirical counterparts of forcing judicial attention to
underlying constitutional values in deciding questions of fourth
amendment coverage.
C. THE EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATION: THE EMERGING APPROACH
The Supreme Court has embraced the empirical interpretation
of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, despite the nor-
mative theorists' admonitions to the contrary. The Court has found
the assumption of risk approach particularly attractive.113
The Court explicitly employed assumption of risk analysis in
Smith v. Maryland' 14 to support the conclusion that a police insti-
gated installation of a "pen register" 1 5 to record numbers dialed
from a suspect's phone did not constitute a fourth amendment
"search." The Court applied Justice Harlan's Katz standard,' 16
doubting that the suspect entertained subjective expectations of pri-
vacy regarding the phone numbers he dialed.1 7 Even if the subjec-
tive expectation of privacy prong of the Katz test had been satisfied,
however, the Court concluded that the suspect's expectation was
not "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able' "under the objective prong. 118 Because the suspect volunta-
rily conveyed information about the dialed numbers to the phone
company,1 9 he "assumed the risk that the company would reveal to
police the numbers he dialed."' 120
112 See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 114, 121 & 127 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), where the Court found no violation of privacy expectations.
A governmental informer, carrying a concealed radio transmitter, engaged defendant in
incriminating conversations in his home which were overheard by the use of the radio
equipment. The defendant clearly assumed the risk that any confidant might simply go
to the police with the incriminating information, thus the Court held that the defendant
assumed the risk that his confidant was wired. Id. at 751-53.
Several Justices dissented in White including justice Harlan, the author of the "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" formula in Katz. See supra text accompanying note 109.
For the dissents ofJustices Douglas and Marshall, respectively, see 401 U.S. at 756-68,
795-96.
114 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
115 A pen register is a mechanical device which records numbers dialed on a tele-
phone without overhearing oral communications or indicating whether the calls were
actually completed. Id. at 736 n.1.
116 Id. at 740.
117 Id. at 742-43.
118 Id. at 743-46.
119 The Court noted that all telephone users realize that they must convey phone
numbers to the phone company. Id. at 742.
120 Id. at 744. The Smith dissenters applied normative theory in concluding that the
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The Court employed similar reasoning in Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 12 1 holding that the petitioner's failure to take "normal precau-
tions to maintain .. .privacy"'122 when entrusting possession of
illegal drugs to an acquaintance who put them in her purse led to a
denial of his "standing" to raise fourth amendment objection to a
subsequent police search of the purse.123 The Rawlings Court found
that because petitioner had no right to exclude other persons from
access to the purse, he had no claim against the government.' 24 Pre-
sumably, the petitioner assumed the same risk of intrusion from the
government as was posed by the owner of the purse.' 25 Thus, the
absence of privacy expectations against a private third party led the
Court to the conclusion that no such expectations existed against
the government.' 26
The recent "beeper" cases also reflect the assumption of risk
approach. In United States v. Knotls, 127 the Court applied the Smith
risk analysis, 128 holding that no search occurred when the govern-
ment monitored the whereabouts of a suspicious chemical 129 by hid-
ing a beeper device in the chemical's container prior to the time a
suspect possessed it. The beeper permitted surveillance of the
chemical as it traveled in the suspect's car. Because the suspect
would have no expectation of privacy had his car been visually fol-
lowed by the police, the Court found that no increased privacy ex-
pectation was created by means of the hidden beeper. 130 The
suspect assumed the risk of surveillance either way.
Once inside a private dwelling, however, the risks of surveil-
suspect "should be entitled to assume that the numbers he dials in the privacy of his
home will be recorded, if at all, solely for the phone company's business purposes." Id.
at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
122 Id. at 105.
123 Id. at 104-06. Earlier the Court held that "standing" to raise fourth amendment
challenges depended entirely on one's ability to satisfy the Katz expectation of privacy
test. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
124 448 U.S. at 105.
125 In a case subsequent to Rawlings, the Court stated: "[W]hen an individual reveals
private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that
information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit governmental use of the information." United States v.Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652,
1658 (1984).
126 The dissenters in Rawlings took the majority to task for its narrow application of
the privacy expectations standard. 448 U.S. at 114-21 ( Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
128 Id. at 283.
129 The chemical, chloroform, is a "precursor chemical" used in manufacturing illicit
drugs. Id. at 278.
130 Id. at 281-85.
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lance decrease. In United States v. Karo,131 the Court held that the
use of a beeper to monitor the whereabouts of suspicious chemicals
inside a private residence constituted a violation of a recognizable
expectation of privacy.132 Unlike the situation in Knotts, surveillance
from outside the house could not have conveyed the same informa-
tion ultimately obtained by the beeper.' 33 Therefore, privacy ex-
pectations increased and assumptions of risk diminished as the
chemicals entered the dwelling.
D. PALMER AND THE BALANCING APPROACH
Palmer perpetuates the Court's commitment to the empirical in-
terpretation of the Katz standard. Rather than employing assump-
tion of risk analysis to prison searches as it might have done, 134 the
Court employs the balancing approach in disposing of Palmer's
claim. Indeed, Hudson v. Palmer may represent the Court's first full
scale use of this analysis in assessing the fourth amendment validity
of a claimed privacy expectation. 135
"Determining whether an expectation of privacy is. .. 'reason-
able,'" according to the Palmer Court, "necessarily entails a balanc-
ing of interests," specifically the "interest of society in the security
of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in the pri-
vacy within his cell.''136 The Court strikes the balance in favor of the
government based upon the perceived weight of empirical data es-
tablishing security risks within penal institutions. Simply because
the government's interest is judged substantial, the Court concludes
that Palmer has no reasonable expectation of privacy, thus negating
his claim without ever assessing it in terms of the underlying consti-
tutional values. The Court concludes that prisoners have no legiti-
131 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
132 Id. at 3303-04.
133 Id.
134 The Court could have concluded that Palmer assumed the risk of privacy intru-
sions by committing crimes sufficient to send him to prison where such violations are
known to be the "order of the day." Something approaching this reasoning is found in
J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975), where the court found no "search" where a
foster parent eavesdropped upon telephone conversations of the juvenile in her charge.
The court based its reasoning partly on the view that the juvenile had been placed in the
foster home as an alternative to placement in a correctional institution where "official
surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day." Id. at 175 (footnote omitted).
Apparently, to the court inJ.M.A., risks of such intrusions are assumed by those commit-
ting offenses. See also van den Haag, supra note 1, at 159: "[T]he criminal foregoes
privacy by voluntarily acting against the public interest, of which, therefore he becomes
an object."
135 Brief allusions to the balancing approach are made in at least one other Supreme
Court case. See supra note 96 discussing United States v. Miller.
136 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
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mate expectation of privacy, and thus fails to address the
reasonableness of the particular intrusion in Palmer's case.13 7
Justice O'Connor reaches the same result by blurring the
"search" and "reasonableness" issues and finding prison searches
and seizures categorically "reasonable" because governmental in-
terests outweigh prisoners' privacy claims.1 3 8 Like the ChiefJustice,
Justice O'Connor generates her conclusion in light of empirical con-
siderations establishing prison security needs, paying little attention
to fourth amendment values.
Even the Palmer dissenters seem somewhat beguiled by this em-
pirical approach. While more sensitive to normative considerations
than their colleagues in the majority, 39 the dissenters nevertheless
note the absence of empirical data-as if it were crucial-as a flaw in
the conclusion that society is not prepared to recognize the reasona-
bleness of Palmer's claim. 140
The Palmer Court's reliance on the balancing approach is signif-
icant because it signals an increased level of commitment by the
Court to empirical assessments of the issue of fourth amendment
scope. Although the assumption of risk approach is also essentially
empirical,' 4 ' it differs from the balancing approach by isolating the
privacy claim and analyzing it apart from law enforcement issues.
Risk analysis, while controversial, 42 at least possesses the analytic
virtue of assessing the privacy issue in the abstract without injecting
law enforcement interests into the inquiry. 143 The fourth amend-
ment supposedly protects personal privacy and not governmental
137 Id. at 3202.
138 See supra notes 26-36, 41-47 & 71-77 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor
weighed "the asserted governmental interests against the particular invasion of the indi-
vidual's privacy... established by the facts of the case." 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). She saw a strong governmental interest in maintaining prison security
and no privacy interest in the prisoner-"[t]he fact of arrest and incarceration abates all
legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy." Id. Therefore, "all searches and seizures of the
contents of an inmate's cell are reasonable." Id.
For authority for her "categorical" approach to prison searches (see supra notes 41-
45 and accompanying text),Justice O'Connor relied on United States v. Robinson, but the
value of Robinson is questionable in the context of Palmer because the issue in Robinson
was whether intrusions, admittedly "searches and seizures," were "reasonable" in the
absence of warrants. See supra note 43. Robinson may thus support a "balancing" ap-
proach on the "reasonableness" issue, but is tenuous authority for a similar approach on
the "search and seizure" issue.
139 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
140 See supra text accompanying note 54.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 98 & 109.
143 Assumption of risk theory is thus more consistent with the analytic tradition of




interests in law enforcement. 144 The balancing approach poses sub-
stantial risk of "balancing away" privacy in favor of accommodations
to law enforcement145 in a variety of contexts,1 46 without ever ad-
dressing the fourth amendment reasonableness of the particular
intrusion. 147
The Palmer decision vividly illustrates the need for a normative
approach to fourth amendment issues of scope. The Court never
explains why -even granting the full thrust of the government's
claims -Palmer must be denied that tiny residuum of privacy which
would permit him to litigate his claims of guard harassment, 48 a
blatant form of unreasonable governmental conduct. When the is-
sue is normatively couched in terms of whether Palmer's privacy
claims should be recognized in light of fourth amendment values, the
Palmer result appears incorrect.' 49 The systematic employment of
harassment searches, limited only by the self-restraint of prison
functionaries, certainly results in an "amount of privacy remaining
to citizens . . diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims
of a free. . . society."150 If the Palmer Court is serious in claiming
144 See supra note 75.
145 Apart from the questionable wisdom of negating inmate rights by appeals to se-
curity needs (see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text), some commentators argue
that the balancing approach is logically incoherent in cases such as Palmer. Assuming a
"right" in the prison administration to maintain prison security, it hardly follows that
Palmer has no right to privacy:
If a prisoner's right conflicts with somebody else's right, it does not necessarily fol-
low that it is the prisoner who must tolerate without protest the subordination or
repudiation of his right; it may well be the other party whose right should give way.
All that follows from a situation in which two rights conflict is that the proper course
of conduct cannot be settled without appealing to something apart from the con-
flicting rights themselves.
Bedau, supra note 68, at 698 (footnote omitted).
146 The Palmer analysis may extend beyond the prison context to privacy issues arising
in jails. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. Moreover, the balancing ap-
proach may well result in a denial of fourth amendment coverage in contexts not ex-
plored in this Article, such as juvenile detention centers (see supra note 134), and mental
hospitals (see, e.g., State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1979)), where
security demands are said to be especially high.
147 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
149 The language of the Palmer Court's test can be read as embracing a normative
assessment of the scope issue. In addition to deciding whether privacy expectations are
"reasonable," the Court indicates that the inquiry should be directed towards "justifi-
able" expectations as well. See supra text accompanying note 27. The distinction is not
merely semantic, given the fact that the latter term invites attention to constitutional
values while the former may be simply a matter of discovering factual or "normal" ex-
pectations. See Yackle, supra note 90, at 361.
150 The formulation of the test is Professor Amsterdam's. See supra text accompanying
note 108. The issue in Palmer is not whether prison authorities can do shakedown




that "intentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals
cannot be tolerated by a civilized society,"'1 51 it must recognize the
fourth amendment validity of Palmer's claim. Regardless of coun-
tervailing interests, Palmer ought to have a sufficient privacy interest
to enable him to litigate the merits of his case. 152 Such a conclusion
does not deny prison authorities the power to conduct random
shakedowns. It simply denies them the power to conduct malicious
ones.153
The Court should remember the admonition of Professor
Amsterdam:
The question of what constitutes a covered 'search' or 'seizure'
should be viewed with an appreciation that to exclude any particular
police activity from coverage is essentially to exclude it from judicial
control and from the command of reasonableness, whereas to include
it is to do no more than say that it must be conducted in a reasonable
manner. With the question put in this fashion, the answer should sel-
dom be delivered against coverage. 154
By excluding harassment searches from fourth amendment
scrutiny, the Court ignores privacy claims regarding prison cells.
But, as discussed immediately below, Palmer may be the harbinger of
even more substantial denials of inmate privacy, resulting in a con-
stitutional void that jeopardizes the protection of basic human rights
of the incarcerated.
151 See supra note 39.
152 Successful harassment suits would no doubt be very rare due to difficulties for
inmates to effectively prove their claims. The infrequency of success should be no rea-
son, however, to deny all inmates the opportunity to prove their cases. See supra notes
64-66 and accompanying text. On the other hand, permitting such suits may be vitally
significant from the inmate's point of view. See supra text accompanying note 53.
For a discussion of theoretical problems in bringing harassment actions once the
fourth amendment remedy is removed, see infra text and notes 169-77, 182-86, 215-26.
153 The doctrine advocated in the text would find "searches and seizures" whenever
inmates allege privacy intrusions motivated solely for the purpose of harassment. This
Article also suggests that certain other alleged privacy intrusions should fall within the
scope of the fourth amendment. See infra notes 193-214 and accompanying text.
The proposed approach breaks with traditional scope analysis in its attention to the
intent of the searcher as a crucial factor in defining protected privacy. For the view that
the privacy issue should be determined without taking the conduct of the governmental
intruder into account, see supra text accompanying note 77. Thus the proposed ap-
proach, like most normative varieties, tends to blur "search" and "reasonableness" is-
sues. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. The proposed approach does not,
however, beg the "reasonableness" issue by its finding that malicious, harassing intru-
sions constitute searches and seizures. The approach simply takes the alleged bad faith
of the searcher into account by giving the inmate "standing" to litigate the issue of the
reasonableness of the intrusion. See supra note 123. "Harassment searches" generate
standing because they violate the residuum of privacy to which inmates are entitled. See
supra notes 58, 59 & 149-52 and accompanying text.
154 Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 393.
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IV. PALMER AND THE PROTECTION OF PRISONERS' DIGNITY
Despite the dissenters' hopes that an enclave of protected per-
sonal privacy will remain intact after Palmer,155 the logic of the ma-
jority opinion seriously undercuts all privacy claims by prisoners. If
so, the total loss of privacy protection precludes adequate judicial
oversight of fundamental rights of human dignity.
A. PALMER AND PERSONAL PRIVACY
While Palmer dealt with searches of cells, its rationale equally
extends to personal searches of inmates. The threat of secreting
contraband or weapons on the person is no less substantial than the
risk of such items being kept in prison cells. 156 If interests of prison
security outweigh claims of privacy in cells, the same interests ne-
gate assertions of rights to privacy of the person, unless of course
personal privacy is perceived as constitutionally more substantial
than the privacy interest raised in Palmer. Although some lower
courts have held that intrusions into personal security are
"searches" where the same means of intrusion directed to personal
property is not within the scope of the fourth amendment, 157
Supreme Court case law suggests little basis for such a distinction in
prison contexts. 158
Bell v. Wolfish 159 is the Court's only significant examination of
inmate privacy before Palmer.'60 Wolfish upheld, despite fourth
amendment objection, jail practices of unannounced cell shake-
downs and of visual inspection of inmates' body cavities after
155 See supra text accompanying note 67.
156 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), discussed infra notes 159-65 and
accompanying text. Contraband or weapons can be concealed in pockets or under
clothing or in body cavities. Id. But see Note, Constitutional Limitations on Body Searches in
Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1033, 1050-51 (1982) (questioning legitimacy of routine body
cavity intrusions due to "anatomical considerations" which limit the kinds and amounts
of contraband that can be secreted on the body).
157 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477-78, reh'g denied,
693 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1982) (dog sniffs of school students are "searches," but dog sniffs
of their lockers and automobiles are not "searches").
158 See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text. Outside the prison context, the
Court has cautioned that intrusions into the body will be scrutinized more strictly than
less intrusive searches of the person. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236
(1973) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (pumping of arrestee's
stomach)).
159 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
160 Two early cases, Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) and Stroud v. United
States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), reh'g denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920) held, respectively, that the
fourth amendment permitted use in evidence of conversations monitored while an in-
mate was in jail and of letters obtained in an inmate's cell. As both Lanza and Stroud pre-
date Katz, their current validity is doubtful. See Singer, supra note 9, at 674.
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contact visits with persons from outside the institution. The Court
admitted that the issue of body-cavity searches "instinctively gives
us the most pause"' 61 and that "abusive" searches of the person
"cannot be condoned," 162 but applied exactly the same reasoning
process in upholding both the shakedown and body inspection in-
trusions. Assuming arguendo that inmates retain some fourth
amendment rights, the Court weighed the privacy interest against
the state interest in maintaining institutional security. 163 The Court
held that both the cell shakedowns and the body-cavity intrusions
were reasonable as necessary security measures. 164 Moreover, the
Wolfish Court intimated that its analysis would apply in both prison
and jail contexts. 165
Palmer rejects the Wofish view that prisoners might retain pri-
vacy in their cells. Rather than assess the reasonableness of shake-
downs on a case-by-case basis, the Palmer Court opts for a bright line
rule denying privacy protection altogether. The virtues of a similar
bright line rule for personal searches are equally persuasive. As-
suming that balancing is now the order of the day, the government's
interest in routinely searching the persons of inmates may be more
"reasonable," in general, than their claims that such action consti-
tutes invasions of privacy. If so, the same logic which led to re-
jecting Wofish's position regarding the nature of privacy in cells may
also lead to rejecting its notion that personal privacy might be
protected.
The Wofish Court was concerned that personal searches not be
"abusive."' 166 This concern is no guarantee, however, that the
fourth amendment is available to remedy abuses when they occur.
The Palmer Court also warned against the evils of harassment
searches, 167 yet it denied privacy protection to prisoners' papers
and effects. The Supreme Court thus may view abusive searches of
the person as it does non-personal harassment searches: not as vio-
lations of protected privacy, but rather as matters governed by the
cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. 168
161 441 U.S. at 558.
162 Id. at 560.
163 Id. at 557-58.
164 Id. at 557-60.
165 Id. at 558. For the sake of argument, the Court assumed that "both convicted
prisoners and pretrial detainees retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commit-
ment to a corrections facility."
166 See supra text accompanying note 162.
167 See supra text accompanying note 39.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 39 & 40. The Wolfish Court does cite a fourth
amendment case, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966), for the propo-
sition that abusive searches of the person are forbidden. 441 U.S. at 560. Schmerber,
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B. PRIVACY AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Although Palmer seems to undercut the fourth amendment basis
for rights to privacy in either the shakedown or personal search con-
texts, inmates arguably might retain privacy protection under sub-
stantive due process doctrine.1 69 Palmer does not specifically
address the issue, °70 but the Court would probably reject due pro-
cess privacy claims for the same reasons it dismissed the fourth
amendment privacy argument.
If society is unwilling to recognize the reasonableness of inmate
claims to protected privacy as a fourth amendment matter, these
claims would not suddenly become tenable under a due process
doctrine that requires that a personal right be deemed "fundamen-
tal" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" before qualifying
as protected privacy. 17 1 In light of Palmer, inmates appear to lack
such "fundamental" interests. Moreover, they may be unable to
show a sufficient "liberty" interest as the necessary due process
predicate for the right to privacy. 172 The Court has held in proce-
dural due process contexts that prisoners possess no constitution-
ally based liberty interest once convicted and sentenced to
prison. 173 Therefore, prisoners' claims of a substantive right to
however, is not a prison case-it dealt with the taking of a blood sample from a suspect
while in a hospital. This citation in Wofish is made in the context of a discussion which
merely assumes for the sake of argument that the fourth amendment applies to personal
searches, the same tenuous ground granted cell searches by Woylish. As Palmer rejects
the arguendo premise for cell searches, it seemingly entails a rejection of Wofih 's similar
premise that personal searches are arguendo within fourth amendment purview.
169 "The doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property are sub-
ject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed has come to
be known as substantive due process." Developments: The Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1166 (1980) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (abor-
tion as right to privacy under due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 500
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 503 (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (right to marital privacy under fourteenth amendment due process clause).
170 But see infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
171 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
172 See supra note 169.
173 See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) ("[G]iven a valid conviction,
the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that
the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the
conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.") The Meachum
Court used this reasoning to reject a prisoner's claim that transfer from one prison to
another constituted a denial of liberty triggering procedural due process requirements.
The Court found that "[tihe conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's lib-
erty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons." Id. (emphasis in
original). See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 462 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court seems to assume that after his conviction a prisoner has, in essence, no
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privacy grounded in due process likely would be rejected by the
Court. 174
Palmer itself implicitly denies the viability of due process pri-
vacy. The Court intimated that any such claim merged with the
fourth amendment issue. 175 Moreover, in arguing against fourth
amendment applicability, Hudson maintained that either the due
process clause or the eighth amendment was the appropriate consti-
tutional doctrine to attack harassment searches. 76 The Palmer
Court does not mention due process as a possible remedy for such
searches, but does explicitly note the eighth amendment alterna-
tive.' 77 Thus, the Court appears to disfavor the due process privacy
theory and view the cruel and unusual punishments clause as the
sole constitutional remedy for abusive searches of either persons or
effects.
C. PRIVACY PROTECTION IN JAILS
Thus far this Article's discussion of Palmer and Wolfish has cen-
tered on the Court's abandonment of privacy protection for convicts
sentenced to prison. The same result would seem to obtain, how-
ever, in assessing the rights of pretrial detainees held in jail.
The Wofish opinion suggests that privacy issues in jails and pris-
ons are analytically identical. Although many jail inmates are not yet
liberty save that created, in writing, by the State which imprisons him."); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480 (1980) (state statutes may create prisoner liberty interests under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
174 Various commentators apparently agree that a prisoner privacy right is tenuous
under the Griswold line, perhaps favoring such a right under the fourth amendment. See
supra note 169. Fourth amendment privacy is understood as the right to withhold infor-
mation or experience of oneself from others. See D. RICHARDS, MORAL CRmICIsM OF LAW
93 (1977). In contrast, the sexual privacy aspects of cases like Griswold and Roe v. Wade
turn on the quite different interest in "actfing] in certain ways without threat of govern-
mental sanction or interference or penalty." Id. Thus, substantive due process privacy
creates a "zone of autonomy," a "right to freedom from official regulation" rather than
the traditional fourth amendment "freedom from official intrusion." Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424-25 (1974). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
604 n.32 (1977) (fourth amendment violations are by nature "intrusions into individual
privacy").
For prisoners, the "zone of autonomy'-to the extent it may meaningfully be dis-
cussed at all-seemingly exists through such doctrines as the first amendment or the
eighth amendment, rather than through substantive due process rights to privacy. See
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (prisoners retain free speech rights not in-
consistent with their prisoner status); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam)
(free exercise of religion protected in prison);Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968) (prisoners protected against physical abuse under cruel and unusual punishments
clause).
175 104 S. Ct. at 3197 n.4. See supra note 40.
176 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.15, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
177 See supra text accompanying note 40.
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convicted, they enjoy no enhanced privacy protection through the
presumption of innocence, a principle having "no application to a
determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confine-
ment before his trial has even begun."' 178 The privacy interests of
detainees in jails, whether convicted or not, appear no different than
those of convicted prisoners. Moreover, security needs are at least
as substantial in jails as in prisons. 179 Thus, Palmer implies a denial
of fourth amendment protection to jail detainees because their pri-
vacy claims are outweighed by the governmental interest in main-
taining security.
Like their convicted and imprisoned counterparts, jail inmates
are unlikely to prevail with due process privacy claims. The Wofish
Court rejected the notion that the desire of detainees "to be free
from discomfort" rises to the level of a "fundamental liberty inter-
est"-a necessary predicate to trigger the due process right to pri-
vacy. 180 While due process privacy protection was unavailable,
Woflsh did recognize a liberty interest of a different nature in uncon-
victed detainees to be free from "punishment" while incarcerated in
jail. 181 Convicted inmates serving jail sentences can be punished as
long as eighth amendment requirements are satisfied.' 8 2
178 441 U.S. at 533. The lower courts in Wolfish had strictly scrutinized practices and
conditions of confinement with respect to pretrial detainees and required the govern-
ment to justify its action by a showing of "compelling necessity." Id. at 528. The
Supreme Court found no constitutional basis for the compelling necessity doctrine even
as applied to unconvicted detainees. Id. at 527-31.
179 Id. at 547 n.28.
180 Id. at 534. The Wolfish Court found the right to privacy as expressed in such cases
as Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut, see supra note 169, to be inapposite in the jail
context. 441 U.S. at 534-35.
181 The Court stated: "In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions
of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions
amount to punishment of the detainee." 441 U.S. at 535 (footnote omitted).
Notwithstanding Wolfish, lower courts continue to recognize a substantive due pro-
cess right to privacy for jail inmates. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.
1984) (detainee retains a liberty interest derived from the Constitution in avoiding un-
wanted medication with antipsychotic drugs-inmate "grounds his asserted liberty inter-
est in the right to privacy").
182 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n-.40 (1977):
Eighth Amendment scrutiny [under the cruel and unusual punishments clause] is
appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. . . . [T]he State does not ac-
quire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until





D. THE ABSENCE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION: INADEQUACY OF
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
The upshot of Palmer and WoOfsh appears to be that abusive
searches and seizures will be checked, if at all, by the prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishments (for convicted prisoners)
and the due process rule against punishment without conviction (for
pretrial detainees). Both doctrines (hereinafter collectively referred
to as the "unjustified punishment doctrines") require a finding of
"punishment" as a prerequisite to their application.183 "Punish-
ment" entails the purposeful inducement of suffering upon offend-
ers as a response to their violation of a norm. 8 4 The Supreme
Court consistently has required a showing of punitive intent by the
punisher as a necessary condition for punishment, either in the due
process or eighth amendment contexts. 185 Where the punisher's ac-
tual intent is unclear, the Court permits inferences of punitive intent
if restrictions appear to be "punishment on [their] face" and non-
punitive purposes of the restrictions are unreasonable. 186
In applying the unjustified punishment doctrines, a distinction
should be drawn between the role played by the concept of punish-
ment under the respective theories. Suppose that Inmate A is de-
tained awaiting trial and alleges that a guard is punishing him.
Wolfish clearly teaches that the inmate will be granted due process
relief only upon a showing that the particular conduct of the guard
amounts to punishment. 187 On the other hand, suppose Inmate B is
a convicted offender sent to prison as punishment. If he alleges that
183 A finding of "punishment" is necessary to trigger the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), where four Justices in the
plurality and four in dissent suggested that the definition of punishment should be ana-
lyzed separate from and prior to the "cruel and unusual" issue under the eighth amend-
ment. Id. at 94-100 (plurality); id. at 124-26 (dissent). Likewise, the due process
doctrine requires that "punishment" not be imposed upon the unconvicted. See, e.g.,
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 534-41.
184 The legal and philosophical literature on the meaning of the concept of punish-
ment is extensive. The author has traced some of it elsewhere and therefrom derived
the meaning expressed in the text. See Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Concep-
tual Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791,
795-822 (1982).
185 See, e.g., Belly. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-40 (due process); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at
96-97 (eighth amendment); see Gardner, supra note 184, at 797-818.
186 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20. For a discussion of the problem of circular
reasoning embodied in the "punishment on its face" doctrine, see Gardner, supra note
184, at 810-14.
187 The inmates in Wolfish were unable to terminate the visual body cavity searches
because the Court found the intrusions to be non-punitive in nature. 441 U.S. at 558-




the same guard conduct alleged by A amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment, Inmate B may not be required to show that the particu-
lar conduct amounted to punishment, but only that it was cruel and
unusual.188 Because the conduct occurs within an institution whose
general purpose is to punish, the punitive nature of the guard's ac-
tion in the particular case may simply be assumed by the court. The
matter is uncertain, however.' 89 If one distinguishes, as many ex-
perts advocate, between being sent to prison as punishment and be-
ing sent to prison for punishment, 190 then little basis exists for
inferring that the guard's particular acts occuring within the institu-
tion are necessarily themselves "punishment."''1 1
188 See, e.g. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) where the Court assessed the
eighth amendment quality of medical treatment provided to inmates, concluding that
the government was "punishing by incarceration." The Court rejected the prisoner's
argument that inadequate medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment, hold-
ing that cruelty would be manifested only if "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners" were shown. Id. at 104-05. The Court did not address the issue of
whether the alleged inadequate medical care itself could be, or must be shown to be,
"punishment."
189 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
(1981) are the only two Supreme Court cases remotely on point. In Gamble, the Court
denied the eighth amendment claim on the absence of "cruelty" without specifically
finding that the prisoner had satisfied the "punishment" prong. See supra note 188.
Similarly, in Chapman the Court held that "dauble ceiling" (housing two inmates in a cell
designed for one) did not constitute "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" so as
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 346-52. The Court assumed that
"the conditions of confinement compose[d] the punishment at issue," id. at 347, appar-
ently granting that double ceiling was punishment. The Court noted, however, that not
all "deprivations" occurring within the prison constitute "punishment." Diminished job
and educational opportunities resulting through double ceiling "simply are not punish-
ments." Id. at 348. The Court offered no basis for distinguishing "conditions of confine-
ment" which constitute punishment from "deprivations" of interests while confined
which do not.
190 See, e.g., Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Rehabilitation, 20
CATH. U.L. REV. 365, 388 (1971). The distinction noted in the text is meant to clarify
the theory that punishment consists solely in the loss of liberty inherent in being incar-
cerated and not in the infliction of additional suffering once confined within the institu-
tion. In the words of one federal court: "It is one thing for the State to send a man to
the Penitentiary as a punishment for crime. It is another thing for the State. . .to do
nothing meaningful for his safety, well being, and possible rehabilitation." Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
191 Case law clearly establishes that a given restraint upon a prisoner within a prison
may or may not constitute "punishment" depending upon the purpose for the restraint.
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190-94 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972) (solitary confinement assumed to be punitive); Daughterty v. Carlson, 372 F.
Supp. 1320, 1321-22 (E.D. Ill. 1974) (solitary confinement not "punishment" under
cruel and unusual punishments clause where imposed to protect inmate from physical
harm); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D. Ga. 1970), af'd, 439 F.2d 146 (5th
Cir. 1971) (solitary confinement not "punishment" if utilized as means of preventing
escape-prone inmate from fleeing); Graham v. Willingham, 265 F. Supp. 763, 765 (D.
Kan.), aff'd, 384 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967) (solitary confinement not "punishment" where
[Vol. 76
PRISONER PRIVACY RIGHTS
The unjustified punishment doctrines may be of only limited
utility because they leave constitutionally unchecked many indigni-
ties and indecencies endured by inmates which do not amount to
"punishment" or do not amount to "cruelty" under established
doctrine. The following hypothetical examples of undeniable af-
fronts to privacy1 92 and dignity illustrate some such seemingly un-
protected invasions of fundamental rights.
1. Voyeurism
Suppose male guards working in women's jails and prisons
secretly photograph female inmates as they shower, use toilet facili-
ties, and engage in other intimate activities.' 93 While trying not to
alert the inmates to their actions, the guards distribute the photo-
graphs to other guards and to people outside the institution. Never-
theless, the inmates discover that the guards are photographing
them and bring actions alleging violation of their civil rights.
Pre-Palmer caselaw recognizes violations of constitutional rights
to privacy in such situations. Several cases find violations of inmate
privacy rights where guards of the opposite sex are merely present
in situations where they can viewinmates in the nude. 9 4 According
imposed for inmate's protection and the protection of others); United States v. Hop-
kins, 187 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D. Md. 1960) (solitary confinement not punishment if im-
posed for inmate's "own protection"). Moreover, while systematic corporal punishment
in prisons is cruel and unusual punishment, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968), "isolated assaults" on inmates by prison guards are generally unactionable under
the Federal Civil Rights Act. S. KRANrz, supra note 9, at 182.
192 The concept of privacy is notoriously difficult to define. Some definiton is essen-
tial lest privacy be condemned by the notion that "[a] concept in danger of embracing
everything is a concept in danger of conveying nothing." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAw 888-89 (1978). Whatever its general definition, see supra note 1, privacy
surely encompasses uninvited entry into areas of bodily intimacy. See, e.g., A. WESTIN,
supra note 1, at 14; Gerety, supra note 1, at 266. This is the subject of two of the three
examples to follow in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 193-214. The third
example, infra text accompanying notes 215-23, the unauthorized reading of a person's
diary, also clearly is a situation raising substantial privacy issues. Cf. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 433 (1976) (Marshall,J., concurring).
193 For a non-prison case involving facts similar to the hypothetical in the text, see
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). The analy-
sis in the text would also apply if a female guard made similar observations of a male
inmate.
194 See Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982) (male inmate's alle-
gation that female guards engage in a "certain amount of viewing" of prisoners' intima-
cies may state a valid right to privacy claim); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (male prisoners have "limited right to privacy which includes a right to
be free from the unrestricted observation of their genitals and bodily functions by prison
officials of the opposite sex under normal prison conditions"); Hudson v. Goodlander,
494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980) (male inmate's privacy rights violated by the as-
signment of female guards to posts where they could view him in the nude); Forts v.
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to these courts, the taking of the photographs likely constitutes "un-
reasonable searches" under the fourth amendment, 95 while the
distribution of the photos violates due process privacy.' 96 In the
words of one court: "We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of
privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed
figured from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the op-
posite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal
dignity. '"197
Palmer, however, seriously exacerbates the plight of the photo-
graphed inmates. Assuming that the inmates in either the jail or
prison context must establish that the particular action of the guards
constitutes unjustified punishment, 98 substantial problems arise.
The conduct of the voyeur guards hardly appears to be "punitive."
They intend to inflict no unpleasantness upon the subjects of their
cameras' eyes, indeed they do all they can to assure that the inmates
never discover the intrusions into their intimacy. 199 In fact, the pho-
tographed subjects may never become aware of their alleged unjus-
tified "punishment" until after release from custody. While the
inmates' discovery of the guards' activities will likely result in mental
anguish even if it occurs after release, the resulting suffering of the
former inmates is unlike that generally connected with the concept
of punishment. Punished persons characteristically are aware of
their suffering at the time the actions inducing the unpleasant feel-
Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1099-1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d
Cir. 1980) (female inmate's privacy rights violated by the risk of being viewed by a male
guard while in the nude or using the toilet). But see Grummett v. Rushen, 587 F. Supp.
913, 915-16 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (male inmates' rights to privacy not violated by distant
and casual viewing of them in the nude by female guards); Avery v. Perrin, 473 F. Supp.
90, 92 (D.N.H. 1979) (male inmate's right to privacy not violated even though a female
guard might observe him in the nude while she delivers the mail).
195 Pre-Palmer courts considering the hypothetical case in the text would likely analo-
gize to the non-prison case of York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 989 (1964), where the court suggested that the taking of nude photo-
graphs by the police of a female victim of an assault might constitute an unreasonable
search under the fourth amendment. But see Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Conn. 1966) (no invasion of privacy through a secret filming of a prisoner's appearance
before a parole board).
196 See York, 324 F.2d at 454-56.
197 Id. at 455.
198 Unconvicted detainees would surely be required to show that the particular guard
behavior was punitive. See supra notes 186 & 187 and accompanying text. Convicted
inmates may face a similar requirement. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
For the sake of discussion, the text assumes that convicted inmates will be required to
show "punishment" in particular cases of alleged abuse by prison officials. Without
such a requirement, convicted prisoners may anomolously be afforded greater protec-
tions than their unconvicted counterparts. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203
and note 203.
199 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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ings occur.200 Moreover, punishment entails the purposeful inflic-
tion of suffering. 201 The voyeur guards have no such purpose, nor
are their actions sufficiently "punitive on their face" to cause courts
to infer punitive intent.20 2 Therefore, neither convicted prisoners
nor unconvicted detainees appear able to make the necessary show-
ing of "punishment" to trigger their respective unjustified punish-
ment doctrines. 20 3
200 Id. In discussing the possibility of governing prison searches under the cruel and
unusual punishment clause, a leading article maintains that "[o]nly searches involving
physical abuse and purposeful harassment would be proscribed." Giannelli & Gilligan,
supra note 9, at 1051.
201 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. None of the difficulties with doc-
trines grounded in the concept of punishment discussed in that text are encountered
under a right to privacy theory. While one seemingly cannot be "punished" without
knowing it, privacy invasions do not depend upon the victim's awareness of their occur-
rences and thus may actually be unknown to the intrudee. See Benn, supra note 1, at 10-
11; Gross, supra note 1, at 193; Parker, supra note 1, at 278. The gist of the wrong
inherent in privacy violations is not in the mental distress often associated therein, but in
the denial of human dignity and the assault on human personalty. Bloustein, Privacy as
an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 973-74
(1964).
Eavesdropping and wiretapping, unwanted entry into another's home, may be the
occasion and cause of distress and embarrassment but that is not what makes these
acts of intrusion wrongful. They are wrongful because they are demeaning of indi-
viduality, and they are such whether or not they cause emotional trauma.
Id.
202 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. The conduct of the voyeur guards
manifests few of the "earmarks of punishment." See Gardner, supra note 184, at 810-14.
203 Unconvicted detainees would surely be frustrated in their attempts at establishing
a due process violation because of their inability to show "punishment." See supra notes
180-81, 186-87 and accompanying text. Cf. Olgin v. Darnell, 664 F.2d 107, 108-09 (5th
Cir. 1981) (not "punishment" for jail officials to remove detainee's clothing except for
underwear in response to his assault on another inmate and his threat to set fire to the
jail where expressed purpose of clothing removal was to calm the inmate and to avoid
the risk of fire). Convicted offenders may fare better if, assuming contrary to the assump-
tion made in the text, they can rely on their incarceration in general as sufficient "pun-
ishment" to trigger the eighth amendment inquiry. See supra text accompanying notes
187-91. Even so, they might encounter difficulty in establishing that the voyeur guards'
conduct was "cruel and unusual" under established doctrine requiring "deliberate indif-
ference" to prisoners' interests in being free from unnecessary pain and suffering. See
supra note 188; see also supra note 200. The voyeur guards do not "deliberately" cause
pain and suffering, indeed they attempt to avoid such by concealing their conduct from
the inmates. Their conduct might thus be characterized as "reckless" or merely "negli-
gent" and not "deliberate." See Dejesus v. Coughlin, No. 83 Civ. 2403, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1984) (in order to state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of the
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, an unreasona-
ble risk of injury must be accompanied by "circumstances indicating an evil intent, or
recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to the consequences of [prison officials']
conduct for those under [their] control"). If, however, the conduct of the voyeur guards
does amount to cruel and unusual punishment so far as the convicted prisoners are
concerned, an anomaly is created because the very same conduct of the guards in the




2. Offensive Body Searches
Certain morally offensive body searches also appear to be un-
protected. Suppose male guards routinely conduct body cavity
searches and manual patdowns of the genital areas of female in-
mates.20 4 The government argues that such intrusions are neces-
sary for security purposes20 5 and cannot entirely be done by female
guards due to possible employment discrimination problems. 20 6 In-
mates object to the intrusions by male guards on two grounds: such
intrusions by males are per se violative of constitutional rights and
the intrusions are often conducted in bad faith either to humiliate
the inmate or to sexually gratify the guard.
As with the voyeur hypothetical, caselaw prior to Palmer would
utilize constitutional rights to privacy to protect the inmates from
intrusive body searches by guards of the opposite sex, even in the
absence of bad faith by the guards. 207 Such searches done to harass
or to sexually gratify would afortiori be prohibited as violations of
inmate privacy. 208
204 Again, the analysis of the hypothetical is the same if female guards make the intru-
sions described in the text upon male inmates. Moreover, the inmate will presumably
encounter essentially the same legal hurdles regardless of whether she is a convicted
prisoner or a pretrial detainee. See supra notes 187-91, 198 and accompanying text.
205 "Security demands" are frequently offered as justification for administrative be-
havior in both the jail and prison contexts. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546-47,
558 (jails); Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872
(prisons). In neither Wolfish nor Daughtery was it alleged that searches were conducted by
members of the opposite sex.
206 See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 44 Or. App. 755, 607 P.2d 206 (1980), afd, 290 Or. 611,
625 P.2d 123 (1981) (male inmates seek injunction against assignments of female guards
to duties entailing anal-genital frisks while corrections officials argue that they were
avoiding employment discrimination).
207 See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907
(1983) (dicta) (male inmate right to privacy offended by frisks by female guards of geni-
tal and anal areas); Gunther v. Iowa Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (dicta) (male inmates' privacy rights might be vio-
lated by female guards' strip searches and surveillance of prison showers and toilets);
Iowa Dep't of Social Serv. v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't, 261 N.W.2d 161, 164-66
(Iowa 1977) (strip or patdown searches of male inmates by female guards constitute
invasions of privacy rights); Sterling v. Cupp, 44 Or. App. 755, 607 P.2d 206 (1980), af'd
290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981) (affirmed on state constitutional grounds) (anal-geni-
tal frisks of clothed male inmates by female guards violate right to privacy). But see Bag-
ley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Or. 1983) (male prisoners have no federal
constitutional rights to freedom from clothed anal-genital "patdowns" or visual obser-
vations in states of undress by female guards).
Some pre-Palmer cases might preclude the searches described in the text even if the
inmate fails to allege that the search is conducted by a member of the opposite sex. See,
e.g., Frazier v. Ward, 528 F. Supp. 80 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (fourth, eighth and fourteenth
amendments violated by routine body-cavity searches).
208 Pre-Palmer courts would surely invalidate such intrusive body searches on fourth
amendment grounds, even in the wake of Wolfish. As one court described its fourth
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If the analysis of this Article is correct, however, inmates now
raising constitutional objection to offensive body searches face se-
vere difficulties. In cases where the searching guard of the opposite
sex does not act in bad faith, the inmate likely has no remedy. The
guard's action simply is not "punishment" under either the eighth
amendment or due process doctrines.20 9 No punitive purpose is
present. The guard is not seeking to induce suffering in the inmate
but rather to keep the institution free of weapons and contraband.
Nor is the conduct "punishment on its face" so as tojustify an infer-
ence of punitive intent.2 10 Even if it were, the action may neverthe-
less be "reasonable" in light of the non-punitive interests in
maintaining security and promoting equal employment opportunity
between the sexes.211
Inmates alleging illicitly motivated body searches will also en-
counter problems in establishing the punitive nature of such intru-
sions. Sexually motivated searches may not, in fact, be
"punishment" under established doctrine because they lack the nec-
essary factor of punitive purpose.21 2 Again, because body searches
by guards of the opposite sex do not manifest "punishment on its
face," courts are unlikely to infer punitive intent.213 Therefore,
even harassment searches, which may indeed be motivated by puni-
tive purpose, may escape judicial scrutiny if searchers deny illicit
motivation and assert security needs or equal employment argu-
ments as justification for their actions.
3. Illicit Property Searches
A return to Palmer's cell search context provides a final illustra-
tion of the apparent constitutional void created by the Court. Sup-
pose Guard A routinely, but secretly reads an inmate's diary left in
his unoccupied cell during the day.2 14 Guard A is not motivated by
amendment effect, "Wolfish does not stand for the proposition that strip searches areper
se constitutional, but rather, that body cavity searches are not per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment." Frazier v. Ward, 528 F. Supp. at 81. Strip searches conducted
to harass or to sexually gratify would clearly be "unreasonable" under the fourth
amendment.
209 See supra notes 184-91, 198 and accompanying text.
210 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 205-06 and accomapnying test; see also Bagley v. Watson, 579 F.
Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983) (female correctional officers' federal rights to equal employ-
ment supercede male inmates' privacy rights under state constitution).
212 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
213 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
214 Arguably, the hypothetical inmate will encounter essentially the same legal hurdles
regardless of whether he is a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee. See supra notes
187-91, 198 and accompanying text.
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any legitimate state interest, but is simply interested in prying into
the intimacies of the inmate's life. Apart from sharing the details of
the diary with fellow guards, Guard A makes every effort to keep this
activity secret. Guard B, on the other hand, also reads the diary but
humiliates the inmate by publishing its contents to others while in
the inmate's presence. 215 The inmate discovers the clandestine
activities of Guard A and brings a civil rights action against both
Guards A and B.
In the past when courts honored fourth amendment privacy
rights of the incarcerated, the hypothetical inmate may well have re-
covered against Guard A,216 and, as the court of appeals decision in
Palmer itself reflects, would likely also have prevailed against Guard
B. 2 17 Such is apparently not the case after Palmer.
As in the earlier examples, the actions of Guard A are non-puni-
tive. Like the voyeur guard, Guard A attempts to keep his actions
unknown to the inmate. However reprehensible his conduct, it sim-
ply does not amount to punishment under either the eighth amend-
ment or due process doctrines. 218 Therefore, under current
doctrine Guard A likely acted within the Constitution.
The inmate might fare better in the action against Guard B
whose actions may well be characterized as "punishment" if in-
tended to cause the inmate to suffer.219 If, however, Guard B re-
215 The hypothetical is not entirely fanciful: "'In weekly shakedowns of the cells,'
complains an inmate of a well-known penitentiary, 'they [the guards] read the mail and
then they make derogatory remarks later about people mentioned in the letters.'"
Schwartz, supra note 2 at 230 n.9 (quoting Chicago Tribune, Nov. 16., 1971, §IA, at 4).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 126-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982), where
the court found an illegal fourth amendment search when correctional officers read a
detainee's private papers during a cell search for contraband. The court rejected the
government's argument that the reading was justified because the officers, while sorting
through the inmate's papers during an authorized search for contraband, saw certain
words in the papers which triggered an institutional need for further investigation.
But see DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1983) (officer justifiably
examined prisoner's diary during general search after riot where diary entry contained
riot-related material); United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 904 (1981) (search into sealed letter in cell ordinarily impermissible but justi-
fied where search prompted by tip of escape plan and officer suspected that letter con-
tained map for escape); State v. Manning, 323 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Iowa 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1111 (1983) (no invasion of privacy where officials read inmate's letters, some
"on a table in plain view," others thrown into the wastebasket).
217 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 184-86, 198-202 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. The matter is not entirely clear,
however, because the suffering may lack punishment's characteristic as a sanction im-
posed as a response to a violation of a norm. See generally Gardner, supra note 184, at
798-817. Therefore, while the guard's conduct surely should be morally disparaged, it
may not, strictly speaking, be a form of "punishment."
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sponds to the inmate's allegations of unjustified punishment by
asserting that he meant no harm or embarrassment to the inmate by
his remarks, courts might find Guard B's conduct non-punitive.
Guard B's actions, while morally objectionable, do not bespeak
"punishment on its face" so as to permit inferences of punitive in-
tent.2 20 The affront to the inmate's dignity may in fact have been
the product of a slip of the tongue, with no animus towards the
inmate. If so, Guard B does not act unconstitutionally because he
does not "punish," nor perhaps even act "cruelly" 22 1 towards the
inmate.222
4. Privacy, Dignity and Unjustifiable Punishment
The above hypotheticals exemplify the value of the right to pri-
vacy as a protection of human dignity. While unjustified punish-
ment always constitutes an affiront to dignity, the hypotheticals
illustrate that not all affronts to dignity entail unjustified punish-
ment. Many, perhaps all, such affronts do entail violations of pri-
vacy. 223 If all privacy protection is denied and inmates are now
required to rely on the unjustified punishment doctrines, the Court
would have jeopardized the protection of basic human rights. With-
out adequate federal constitutional protection, incarcerated persons
enduring the kinds of indignities illustrated above would be left to
seek uncertain relief under state law224 or worse, to simply rely on
220 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 188, 200 & 203 (discusses the "deliberate indifference" standard
required to be satisfied before eighth amendment "cruelty" is established).
222 The text's assumption that inmates will encounter great difficulty establishing that
harassment searches violate the cruel and unusual punishments clause is borne out by
the fact that the fourth circuit found Palmer's attempts to conceptualize his claim of
harassment under the eighth amendment to be "without merit." Palmer v. Hudson, 697
F.2d at 1221 n. 1. "The districtjudge properly reasoned that defendant's actions do not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment .... " Id.
223 A rich literature links the concepts of dignity and privacy. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 201. See also C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 145; Chapman, Personality and Privacy in
PRIVACY 236, 240 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1971); Paust, Human Dignity as a Consti-
tutional Right: A Jurisprudetially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145,
176-178 (1984); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under
the Fourth and Fih Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 987 (1977).
Prior to Palmer, the Supreme Court itself had recognized the relationship between
privacy and dignity. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (public frisk, an inva-
sion of privacy and thus a fourth amendment search, is also a "serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person which may inflict a great indignity"); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (the "overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to pro-
tect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State"); United
States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951) (Douglas,J., concurring) ("[w]e in this coun-
try ... early made the choice - that the dignity and privacy of the individual were
worth more to society than an all-powerful police").
224 While some state courts have been active in protecting inmate rights under state
1985]
114 MARTIN R. GARDNER [Vol. 76
the mercy of prison functionaries. 225
V. CONCLUSION
Hudson v. Palmer signals an undesirable movement towards a
balancing approach in defining fourth amendment scope which seri-
ously jeopardizes the ability of prisoners to protect their right to
basic human dignity. But even if prisoners ultimately are able to
avoid, one way or another, the potential evil effects of Palmer,226 the
Supreme Court has set an unfortunate example by its unjustified
constitutional law, see, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981), the gen-
eral trend historically has been for courts to adopt a "hands-off" approach to prisoner
complaints. See S. KRANTz, supra note 9, at 109-16. To the extent that the judiciary has
recently rejected the "hands-off" approach, the rejection has been led generally by fed-
eral courts applying the Federal Constitution. Id. at 11. Moreover, state legislatures
typically have not adequately responded to the human rights needs of inmates, thus
leaving appeal to the courts for constitutional relief as their sole avenue of protection.
See S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECuTION 445-47 (2d ed. 1973).
Even if adequate state remedies did exist, the kinds of indignities outlined in the
hypotheticals in the text offend federal constitutional values and therefore should also
be constitutionally prohibited. As Justice White has stated:
The fact that a person may have a state-law cause of action against a public official
who tortures him with a thumbscrew for the commission of an antisocial act has
nothing to do with the fact that such official conduct is cruel and unusual punish-
ment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the majority's view was implic-
itly rejected this Term in Estelle v. Gamble, . . . when the Court held that failure to
provide for the medical needs of prisoners could constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment even though a medical malpractice remedy in tort was available to prison-
ers under state law.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 690-91, (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
225 For discussions of the need for legal checks on the administration of prisons and
jails, see, e.g., Cohen, The Discovery of Prison Reform, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 855 (1972);
Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795 (1969);
Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoner's Rights Litigation, 23
STAN. L. REV. 473 (1971); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits
in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979).
226 In addition to the possibility of state constitutional remedies, see supra note 224,
there are several legislative models proposed to protect the privacy interests of incarcer-
ated persons. See, e.g., MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND RE-
SPONSIBILITIES, 59-61 (Center for Criminal Justice, Boston University School of Law
1973); Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Correction Act § 4-119
(1978); ABA CiminalJustice Section Project on Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners,
14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 526-36 (1977).
Prisoners may also find relief under tort actions for invasion of privacy if such ac-
tions exist in the jurisdiction and courts are willing to apply them in the prison context.
See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 851-66 (5th ed. 1984).
Finally, a window of federal constitutional relief may still be available under the
fourth amendment if courts limit Palmer to cell search contexts. At least one lower court
has done just that. See Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1223-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
But see supra notes 155-68 and accompanying text. Moreover, the evils described in the
test may be avoided if courts liberally construe the concept of "punishment" under the
eighth amendment and due process unjustified punishment doctrines. But see supra
notes 169-223 and accompanying text.
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failure to assure the fundamental human rights of the incarcerated,
a class of persons hidden from public view and susceptible to gov-
ernmental mistreatment. Palmer's failure to embrace the enlight-
ened jurisprudence which granted judicial recognition of a
modicum of privacy as a necessary means of assuring inmate dignity
constitutes a backward step in the quest for a legal order which re-
spects and protects the personhood of all citizens.
